«ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OF THE FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE CONSERVATION, BUILDING AND NUCLEAR SAFETY Project No. (FKZ) 3711 11101 ...»
More generally, the question of governance encompasses more than binding legal rules. In this sense, our understanding of “governance” is broader than “regulation”. 452 We also include formal and informal, implicit and explicit processes, procedures and institutions, the sum of which relating to geoengineering could be labelled a “regime”. 453 In an analytical sense, the concept of governance is a tool for describing these elements of the political process. In a normative sense, the concept of “good” governance is intended to contribute to specific objectives and is applied to assess and design governance accordingly. 454 Governance, meant in this broader sense, is not necessarily restrictive. It can also provide legal certainty and political legitimacy, or fulfil pragmatic functions such as coordination. Options for governance design presuppose objectives and functions that such governance is to fulfil, as well as the choices made regarding a particular governance design. However, the geoengineering debate for the most part has not addressed this issue. Most geoengineering governance proposals are not explicit about their underlying assumptions and criteria regarding the objectives and functions they seek to address or leave unaddressed.
This section (project work package 3) analyses why governance of geoengineering should be pursued as well as how such governance should be designed. It sets out reasons for governance of geoengineering, and proposes a set of objectives to be pursued as well as functions to be fulfilled, taking into account particular characteristics of geoengineering. We address these issues by the general term “criteria”, in the sense of standards or principles by which Bodle (2013) 469.
Bodle (2013) 463.
On the concepts and definitions of governance see Pierre and Peters (2005); Kjaer (2004); Rothstein (2003) 49-71.
Cf also the World Bank’s use of the concept, http://go.worldbank.org/G2CHLXX0Q0.
Cf. the definition by Krasner (1983) 2: "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations", Regimes are based on horizontal cooperation between states (and other relevant actors), but usually also address the vertical division of labour.
Cf. Rothstein (2003); Grindle (2004).
Options and Proposals for the International Governance of Geoengineering geoengineering governance design is assessed, and with the help of which governance options are developed. 455 On the basis of these objectives and criteria, and the analysis in sections 4 and 5 (project work packages 1 and 2), we assess gaps in the current framework and develop and assess scenarios and options for future governance of geoengineering. Although ocean fertilisation was not within the scope of the legal analysis in section 5, the current regulatory regime for ocean fertilisation is highly relevant for the emerging overall governance of geoengineering and for the analysis in this section.
Section 6.2 provides an overview of governance proposals in the geoengineering literature.
It aims at capturing key ideas but does not intend to be fully comprehensive in terms of all literature. In section 6.3 we analyse the reasons for geoengineering governance, and set out objectives and criteria it should fulfil. This includes an analysis of reasons why governance is also in the interest of states that could have the means to pursue geoengineering unilaterally. A general key question is how to balance political feasibility with containing risks and preventing impacts. In addition, a cross-cutting aspect is how to address research. Section 6.4 outlines our
general approach to developing regulatory options and identifies main governance options:
From a normative perspective, issues include the available and appropriate legal, regulatory and other governance instruments and techniques. From an institutional perspective, we look at the interplay between existing institutions addressing geoengineering, as well new procedures or institutions, for instance, the suitability of CBD as a central (but not necessarily sole) institution, and the role of the work under the LC/LP. An overarching aspect is to what extent governance should differentiate between different geoengineering concepts and their stages of development. This is linked to the question of defining geoengineering for normative purposes. Special thought and emphasis is given on how to address research. This cross-cutting issue is currently one of the key questions relating to geoengineering. We analyse whether and to what extent research is a category distinct from so-called deployment and whether it should be subject to different rules and governance. Section 6.5 analyses the current international legal framework from a specific governance perspective by providing a gap assessment for each geoengineering technique against the governance criteria developed in section 6.3. and the governance design options developed in section 6.4. On this basis, section 6.6 develops options for filling the governance gaps outlines scenarios for future governance of geoengineering and assesses governance options. Section 6.7 summarises our conclusions.
6.2 Governance proposals Proposals for geoengineering governance rose significantly in the late 2000s, alongside interest in the subject of geoengineering. Such proposals commonly cover key characteristics and principles for governance of research and deployment. Proposals are split between informal and formal governance methods, though fewer offer concrete and actionable frameworks. On the whole, geoengineering scholarship concurs that the existing international law framework does not fully or sufficiently constrain field research or deployment of contemplated techniques, and therefore some form of additional governance is needed. An overview of existing proposals is provided in the annex.
Cf. the similar definitions in the Oxford and Cambridge Dictionaries, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/criterion?q=criterion;
Options and Proposals for the International Governance of Geoengineering
6.2.1 Historical overview
Proposals for geoengineering governance began to rise along with interest in the concept of geoengineering in the mid- to late- 2000s and as international climate change negotiations became more entrenched, with only a handful of papers and analyses on geoengineering governance before that time. The concept of geoengineering, however, existed long before this increase in attention and geoengineering techniques were proposed as a response to anthropogenic climate change as early as the 1960s. 457 While discussion on geoengineering initially existed largely within the scientific community, increasing attention has come from policymakers, academics, and social scientists. 458 Likewise, the late 2000s saw a number of geoengineering governance initiatives arise. For instance, in 2008, the Royal Society established a working group of international experts to provide an assessment of geoengineering proposals, including examination of governance aspects. 459 In 2009, a group of academics submitted the “Oxford Principles” on the regulation of geoengineering research to the UK House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee, which later endorsed the principles, as did the UK government. 460 In 2010, a group of experts gathered at the Asilomar Conference to address geoengineering risks and research standards, recalling earlier efforts that produced voluntary research guidelines on recombinant DNA. 461 The Solar Radiation Management Research Governance Initiative (SRMGI), an international NGO-led project focusing on governance of SRM, was created in 2010 in response to the Royal Society’s 2009 report. 462 Alongside these efforts were government-led initiatives examining geoengineering risks and governance. A joint inquiry on geoengineering was initiated in 2009 by the Science and Technology committees of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.K. House of Commons, with attention to domestic and international governance issues.
6.2.2 Common features of existing governance proposals
Almost all governance proposals view geoengineering as a “last-resort” and maintain that attention should not deviate from mitigation efforts, although most consider that additional research should be performed and governance mechanisms explored. There are notable exceptions, such as Jay Michaelson (1998) calling for abandoning efforts towards a binding mitigation agreement and shifting attention instead towards investment in a “Climate Change Lin (2009); Parson and Ernst (2012).
Keith (2000); Parson and Ernst (2012).
Royal Society (2009).
‘Oxford Principles, History’ http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/oxford-principles/history/.
“SRMGI Solar Radiation Management Research Governance Initiative”, www.srmgi.org/about-srmgi/ “The Regulation of Geoengineering - Science and Technology Committee,” http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/221/22111.htm Options and Proposals for the International Governance of Geoengineering Manhattan Project” on geoengineering. On the other end of the spectrum is the ETC Group, calling for a strict moratorium on all geoengineering experimentation and concluding that geoengineering violates international law.
Options for geoengineering governance are generally grouped into categories of: unilateral state action; review and authorisation by an international consortium; and prohibition on activity. Of these alternatives, the majority of proposals advocate for governance through a multilateral association of states, of sufficient size to foster a sense of legitimacy within the international community. Unilateral action is seen as an outcome to be avoided, and one that adequate governance mechanisms would circumvent. A complete ban on geoengineering activity is generally undesirable, too, as limited research is commonly supported and deployment may become a necessary option in the future, though it has been suggested that imposing a ban would be “easier” than developing an international regulatory regime.
Governance may be either formal (e.g. binding measure through new or existing treaties or under domestic regulation 467) or informal (e.g. through voluntary codes of conduct, principles, and soft law measures ) in nature. Consideration of these two options is split. Some proposals advocate for regulation through modification of existing frameworks or by creating a new framework. Others suggest that preliminary steps should first be taken through less binding, soft law approaches. Voluntary codes of conduct and “bottom-up” efforts are frequently proposed to serve as a foundation for establishing norms and consensus while avoiding political barriers. This is usually discussed in the context of research, rather than deployment.
Advocates of formal regulation lean towards supporting the use of existing instruments versus crafting a new geoengineering-specific agreement, as existing instruments already possess clear decision-making authority and would entail less financial and political costs. On the other hand, some scholars feel that the use of existing instruments will result in a patchwork, ineffective, and insufficiently-integrated approach, and that a new instrument, at least for SRM, could better cover novel geoengineering issues and concerns.
Some proposals address “geoengineering” as a whole, though distinctions are made between governance of CDR and SRM as well as for individual techniques. CDR tends to be viewed as less threatening and correspondingly, governance proposals for CDR are often less strict and receive less focus.
Governance principles that are commonly cited for geoengineering include, inter alia:
• Public participation and consultation in decision-making ETC Group (2010).
See e.g. Bodansky (1996); Virgoe (2007).
“Although some of this literature has considered domestic law and governance, the main focus of interest and concern is at the international level, due to the global scale of effects of both climate change and potential CE interventions.” Parsons (2012).
See e.g. Banargee (2011); SRMGI (2011).
See e.g. Zedalis (2010).
See e.g. House of Commons (2010); Scott (2010).
See e.g. SRMGI; Royal Society (2009); Morgan and Ricke (2010).