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military will have a promising instrument for attacking deeply buried facilities. For example, one concept is to integrate HPM into cruise missiles 39 As evidenced from the level of development of HPM weapons, there is great potential for attacking the electronic infrastructure in a deeply buried facility. For the foreseeable future, successfully disrupting the electrical power, or the electrical circuits that depend on it, is an effective means for disabling a deeply buried facility.
Neutralize Computer and Communications Equipment
The effects of HPM weapons described above have the potential to disable or destroy all the electronics that are located in a deeply buried facility, including computer and communications equipment. Attacks with destructive software viruses that are launched through the internet or directly loaded into the computer network that supports a deeply buried.
facility, or manipulating an enemy's databases, also provide an effective means for degrading a facility's capability to perform its mission.
Environmental control, security, databases and certain manufacturing processes are likely to be controlled by computer systems that are located inside an Underground facility. While it is unclear whether computers provide entry points for information operations to manipulate the information, if these computer networks are designed for maximum security and survivability it is likely that these would be designed with a minimum of external connections.
An attack that focuses on destroying the external communication links and computer controls, including antennas, satellite dishes, and hardwire connections, provides another means for neutralizing an underground facility.
However, it is not easy to locate the external communication connections because the designers of deeply buried facility will adopt many of the external deception and camouflage schemes, as discussed earlier, including low reflectivity, the integration of manmade structures with natural surroundings, and the use of decoys. Furthermore, since external communication connections are a vulnerable aspect of deeply buried facilities, it is likely that the facility will use redundant communication links in order to avoid the vulnerabilities that are associated with external antennas. Lastly, it may be better to leave external antennas intact and undisturbed, rather than destroy these, because these could be used as conduits for an attack with high power microwaves against the equipment that is attached to the antennas. As discussed earlier, antenna arrays are an ideal entry point for using HPMs to destroy the electrical circuits that supports a deeply buried facility.
A reasonable assumption is that with a carefully planned campaign, it is possible to destroy or neutralize deeply buried facilities. The concepts that are discussed in this section range from the use of existing technologies to the development of new ideas and technologies that require further analysis. The broader point is that as states realize that the United States is committed to neutralizing deeply buried facilities, those governments are likely to respond by digging deeper, building harder facilities, and developing mobile facilities, as the Libyans are suspected of doing at Tarhunah. As rogue nations are forced to take increasingly expensive actions to counter U S military capabilities, this represents a success for the United States. The enormous expense that is associated with constructing these facilities will only increase as these states attempt to develop more robust and survivable facilities. Finally, it should be evident that neutralizing deeply buried facilities represents a formidable challenge for the U S military.
While deeply buried facilities have existed for decades, these facilities have emerged as an important challenge for the U S military in the early years of the twenty-first century. Their significance reflects the dangers associated with the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the prospect that rogue states could use these facilities for the manufacture and storage of weapons of mass destruction, as well as housing critical command and control function for the government and the military.
The immediate problem is that, short of the use of nuclear weapons, the current generation of technologies for locating and neutralizing these types of facilities are not sufficient for holding deeply buried facilities at risk. This means that the United States should direct its research and development organizations to develop weapons that will allow U.S. forces to locate, characterize, and neutralize underground facilities. One must also consider that a military response to these facilities may involve more than brute force attacks against the facility or its contents. The use of advanced conventional penetrating weapons may not be sufficient to ensure complete success because if a weapon misses an underground facility by a mere 50 feet, the facility may survive. Furthermore, if it is desirable to preserve the contents of the facility or if collateral damage is politically unacceptable, the use of overwhelming force simply may not be a realistic military option. The implication is that alternative means of neutralizing deeply buried facilities must be vigorously pursued so that the United States and its allies will have the widest range of capabilities and options for destroying these facilities.
The ability to locate, characterize, and neutralize deeply buried facilities is critical to the successful conduct of future military operations. Some of the concepts that will contribute to this capability have been presented in this study, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Summary of Responses to Deeply Buried Facilities In terms of posing a military threat to deeply buried facilities, it will be necessary to coordinate advances in sensor technologies in the geophysical, submariner, and intelligence collection communities.
In fact, many of the major U.S intelligence collection systems must be re-evaluated in terms of their ability to solve the problem that is created by the existence of deeply buried facilities.
If the United States is to solve this problem, then its approach must rest on three fundamental realities about deeply buried facilities. The first is that the threat is real and continues to increase. The consequences for U S.
national security can be devastating if this problem is not addressed Second, the United States must make a long-term commitment to develop the necessary technologies and equipment to locate, characterize, and neutralize deeply buried facilities. For example, the U S. Air Force armament laboratory at Eglin AFB has initiated a call for concepts from industry for developing options for neutralizing deeply buried targets. Third, it is essential to develop programs that will integrate all of the relevant technology, equipment, and strategies that are necessary for defeating deeply buried facilities, which includes all of the military services and the intelligence community.
If this strategy is successful, it should influence the decision making process in states that are considering the construction of such facilities, and perhaps may persuade these governments that deeply buried facilities are not as secure and invulnerable as they once thought. Those governments that are committed to constructing deeply buried facilities will eventually realize that the United States will acquire the technological means for finding and destroying these facilities in the event of war. Finally, the U S. defense establishment must contemplate how the development of deeply buried facilities will affect national security in the twenty-first century.40 Bibliography Adams, James. The Next World War. Computers Are the Weapons and The Front Line Is Everywhere. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1998 Attridgc, W S., and W.D. Gaunter The Deep Underground COC The MITRE Corporation Technical Memorandum TM-3097. Bedford, MA, June 19, 1961 Beach, H.D. and R.A. Lucas. Individual and Group Behavior in a Coal Mine Disaster National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council, Publication 834, Washington D C., 1960.
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1. See Gary Curtin, "The Threats Go Deep," Air Force Magazine, October 1997, p. 47, for the argument that, "Hardened and deeply buries targets have evolved over the years as one of the lessons of Desert Storm. The old 'cut-and-cover' of targets in Desert Storm (i e, dig a hole, build a concrete bunker, and cover it with dirt) arc no long perceived as hard enough, so building things into mountains has become the way to perceived the things that are most important to you. We have witnessed this in Korea for many years…and in a lot of other places in the world."
2. William E Loose, Air Force Research Lab Proposal for Research on Alternatives to Conventional Destruction of Hard, Deeply Buried Targets, Fall 1998.
3. Raymond Bonner, "Mysterious Libyan Pipeline Could Be Conduit for Troops," New York Times, Tuesday, December 2, 1997.
4. See Joseph S Bermudez, Jr, North Korean Special Forces (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998, Appendix B, DMZ Tunnels, p.251.
5. Susanne M. Schafer,"B-2sareCombat Ready, "Air Force Times, April 14, 1997, Vol 57, Issue 37, p 16.
6. Patrick J. Sloyan, "A Policy Change Undone; U.S., Says Nuclear Threat Not Needed" Newsday, February 26,1998.See www.newsday.com/mainnews/rnmi021n.htm.
7. There is an important distinction between finding underground facilities and characterizing their functions. The former tasks of funding facilities is considerably simpler than discerning what is contained in those facilities and what military and governmental functions are performed within an underground facility. The principal focus of this study is on the problems associated with locating and neutralizing these facilities.
8. See Hard Target Smart Fuze Program Office, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, http://vww.wlmn.eglin.af mil/ public/mnmf/htsf html.
9. "The Threats Go Deep," Air Force Magazine, October 1997, p. 47.
10. For information on the English Channel digging rates, see Drew Fetherston, The
Channel, The Amazing Story of the Undersea Crossing of the English Channel " (New York: